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Abnormal Fees and Timely Loss Recognition – A Long-Term Perspective 
 
Abstract 
We examine the relation between timely loss recognition and abnormal audit, non-audit, and total 
fees over a long period (2001–2007 and 2010–2015). We use positive abnormal audit fees as a 
measure of abnormal audit effort, and positive abnormal non-audit fees as a measure of economic 
bond between the auditor and the auditee. Using the Ball and Shivakumar (2006) model, we report 
some evidence suggesting audit effort is associated with slower loss recognition in accruals before 
the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) became effective. However, we find stronger evidence that audit 
effort is associated with slower loss recognition post-SOX when clients raise substantial external 
funds or when the auditor is not an industry specialist. Using C_Score, we find a negative 
association between changes in abnormal audit fees and total fees, and changes in C_Score post-
SOX, but not pre-SOX. We find no sample-wide evidence that abnormal non-audit fees are 
associated with the speed of loss recognition. Collectively, the results suggest post-SOX auditors 
exert more effort when losses are delayed and that non-audit services do not compromise auditor 
independence. 
 
Keywords: Timely loss recognition, Conservatism, Audit fees, Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), 
Accruals. 
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Abnormal Fees and Timely Loss Recognition – A Long-Term Perspective 
 
INTRODUCTION 
External auditors prefer timely loss recognition because it maintains their reputation and 
helps them avoid litigation (Watts 2003). Auditors also face external demand for timely loss 
recognition, because it alleviates agency problems and mitigates information asymmetry between 
managers and outsiders (DeAngelo 1981; LaFond and Watts 2008). Managers, on the other hand, 
because of contract-based incentives, such as compensation, debt covenants, and regulation, often 
prefer delayed recognition of bad news, in the hope of the subsequent arrival of good news 
(Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki 2009). Prior research provides limited 
evidence on how this client-auditor conflict of interest affects timely loss recognition. 
We examine the relation between abnormal audit, non-audit, and total fees on one hand and 
timely loss recognition on the other hand. Since auditors require greater verification for recognition 
of gains than losses (Watts 2003), delaying loss recognition is similar in nature to recognition of 
gains in that both increase income. Thus, greater verification is required before auditors agree to 
delay loss recognition. We therefore use positive abnormal audit fees as a measure of abnormal 
audit effort, and following prior research, positive abnormal non-audit fees as a measure of 
economic bond between auditors and their clients (Srinidhi and Gul 2007; Knechel 2015). We also 
use abnormal total (audit plus non-audit) fees as a measure of both audit effort and economic bond, 
due to potential spillover effects between the two.1 
We use a long sample period (2001–2007 and 2010–2015), including the period following 
the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (henceforth, SOX), which aimed at improving audit 
                                                     
1 Effort exerted in the provision of non-audit services may enhance knowledge spill over and, consequently, may result 
in reduced audit effort (Simunic 1984; Knechel, Krishnan, Pevzner, Shefchik, and Velury 2013). At the same time, 
high audit fees may also be used as an economic bonding channel.  
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quality following several high-profile accounting scandals. As SOX was fully implemented in 
2004, we denote 2001–2003 as the pre-SOX period and 2004–2007 and 2010–2015 as the post-
SOX period. We exclude from our sample the financial-crisis years, 2008–2009, because of their 
special nature.  
Prior literature raises the concern that SOX was politically motivated, not evidence-based 
(DeFond and Francis 2005; Romano 2005), and that its effect on auditors, if any, was only 
temporary (Fargher and Jiang 2008; Feldman and Read 2010; Kao, Li and Zhang. 2014). Other 
studies argue the solutions SOX offers are ineffective in preventing future frauds (Ribstein 2002).2 
By contrast, some studies claim SOX has improved auditing (Carcello, Hollingsworth, and 
Mastrolia 2011; DeFond and Lennox 2011). Assessing these diverging claims is best achieved by 
evaluating evidence gathered over a long period as it is more representative of the long-term 
relations between abnormal fees and loss recognition, as we do here. 
We use two measures of timely loss recognition. The first is based on the piece-linear relation 
between accruals and cash flows, as in Ball and Shivakumar (2006) and Bushman, Lerman, and 
Zhang (2016). The second is the C_Score measure of Khan and Watts (2009). To estimate 
abnormal fees, we use an expected-fee model that captures a large number of possible drivers of 
normal fees, and, consistent with prior studies, we use the regression residuals as a measure of 
abnormal fees.  
Using the Ball and Shivakumar (2006) model, we find no evidence that positive abnormal 
audit or total fees increase the speed of timely loss recognition in either the pre- or post-SOX 
periods. Tests for the differences between the pre- and post-SOX periods suggest slower loss 
                                                     
2 The head of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has expressed a similar concern that audit 
quality has not improved since SOX (Doty 2011). In addition, some studies support the view that SOX is “not 
working” (e.g., Rice, Weber, and Wu 2015). 
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recognition for abnormal audit and abnormal total fees, although the differences are significant at 
the 0.07 and 0.10 levels, respectively. When we use C_Score, we find that abnormal audit and total 
fees are positively related to timely loss recognition pre-SOX, but by contrast, they are negatively 
related to timely loss recognition post-SOX. The difference between the two periods is highly 
significant. We find no evidence that abnormal non-audit fees are associated with slower loss 
recognition in either the pre- or post-SOX periods.  
We further examine the association between abnormal fees and timely loss recognition when 
the client engages in substantial external financing, the auditor is not an industry specialist, and 
the auditor is one of the Big-4 firms. These contextual analyses reveal that positive abnormal audit 
fees are associated with slower loss recognition post-SOX when external financing is substantial 
and when the auditor is not a specialist. We do not find similar evidence in the context of auditor 
size. The findings for positive abnormal non-audit fees are mixed and weaker, suggesting the 
economic bond does not influence loss recognition in these contexts. The results for positive 
abnormal total fees mirror those for positive abnormal audit fees, albeit with lower significance 
levels. We therefore conclude that post-SOX slower loss recognition is associated with additional 
audit effort when clients raise external capital and when the auditor is not an industry specialist. 
In considering these results, two observations are noteworthy. First, owing to stricter 
regulation, more audit effort could be expended in firms with poor reporting quality post-SOX 
(Hribar, Kravet, and Wilson 2014). Our research design may fail to detect the resultant 
improvement in the timeliness of loss recognition. Nevertheless, finding abnormal audit fees are 
associated with slower loss recognition is consistent with greater auditor effort to vet an accounting 
policy that postpones loss recognition to a future period. Second, a contrasting interpretation of 
audit effort views all abnormal fees as a measure of the economic bond. The economic-bond 
hypothesis posits that the lack of economic independence could detract from an auditor’s 
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willingness to withstand client pressure to withhold adverse information (DeAngelo 1981). 3 
However, because we do not find support for the economic-bond hypothesis in abnormal non-audit 
fees, abnormal audit fees seem unlikely to capture the economic bond either.   
Prior studies on audit quality use abnormal accruals as an outcome measure that speaks to 
how well auditors withstand client pressure. Using absolute abnormal accruals as an inverse 
measure of audit quality, we find evidence of lower quality post-SOX for positive abnormal audit 
fees, but not for the other abnormal-fee measures. We also distinguish between positive and 
negative abnormal accruals, but fail to find consistent evidence that positive abnormal fees are 
associated with income increasing abnormal accruals more in the post-SOX period than before. 
The analyses of abnormal accruals provide no compelling evidence that links change in accounting 
quality between the pre- and post-SOX periods to positive abnormal fees. In interpreting the lack 
of consistent results between abnormal accruals and timely loss recognition, we should emphasize 
that the two approaches may not capture the same aspect of accounting quality (Dechow, Ge, and 
Schrand 2010) and that abnormal accruals do not directly speak to the speed of bad-news 
recognition in total accruals. 
PRIOR LITERATURE 
Accounting Conservatism and Timely Loss Recognition 
Basu (1997) defines conditional conservatism as the tendency to recognize bad news faster 
than good news in earnings. Watts (2003) offers a related definition that is based on the higher 
verifiability required for gains than losses. He argues that accounting conservatism is demanded 
                                                     
3 To mitigate against this threat to independence, SOX restricted the provision of many non-audit services.  
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by contracting parties, shareholders, tax authorities, and accounting standard setters. Extant 
accounting research has provided support for some of Watts’s (2003) assertions.4 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005, 2006) extend the Basu measure to timely loss recognition in 
accruals and use negative cash flows as an indicator for bad news. Khan and Watts (2009) develop 
the C_Score measure, a firm-year measure of Basu’s (1997) conditional conservatism that varies 
by a firm’s market-to-book ratio, size, and leverage. Banker, Basu, and Byzalov (2017) show that 
several additional indicators for asymmetric timeliness exist, including changes in sales. Beaver 
and Ryan (2005) explore the interaction between conditional and unconditional conservatism (i.e., 
conservatism that is not news dependent) and establish that the latter preempts the former. Some 
studies criticize Basu's (1997) specification in that it biases upwards the measures of timely loss 
recognition (Givoly, Hayn, and Natarajan 2007; Patatoukas and Thomas 2011, 2015; Banker, 
Basu, Byzalov, and Chen 2016). However, this criticism has, in turn, been challenged (Ryan 2006; 
Ball, Kothari and Nikolaev 2013a, 2013b; Collins, Hribar, and Tan 2014). 
Prior studies have also examined intertemporal changes in the magnitude of accounting 
conservatism. For example, Ball and Shivakumar (2006) argue that the incremental speed of loss 
recognition was higher in the 1990s than in the 1970s and 1980s, while Bushman et al. (2016) find 
that between 2000 and 2014 an overall decline has occurred in the incremental speed of loss 
recognition. Bandyopadhyay, Chen, Huang, and Jha (2010) use an index of several measures of 
conservatism and find it increased from 1997 to 2005. By contrast, Khan and Watts (2009) and 
Callen, Segal, and Hope (2010) find that conservatism has been stable over time. 
                                                     
4 Timely loss recognition has been linked to litigation (e.g., Huijen and Lubberink 2005; Bushman and Piotroski 2006; 
Qiang 2007), debt contracting (e.g., Ball, Robin, and Sadka 2008; Beatty, Weber, and Yu 2008; Nikolaev 2010; Aier, 
Chen, and Pevzner 2014; Haw, J. Lee, and W. Lee 2014), and the agency problem (LaFond and Roychowdhury 2008; 
Lara, Osma, and Penalva 2009; Ramalingegowda and Yu 2012). 
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Notwithstanding the rich literature on the determinants and consequences of conservatism, 
relatively scant research has investigated how client conservatism shapes auditor-induced 
conservatism (DeFond, Lim, and Zang 2016). The discussion in Watts (2003) suggests auditors 
benefit from client conservatism through reduced litigation risk. Consistent with this view, Lee, 
Li, and Sami (2015) find audit fees are negatively related to client conservatism. DeFond et al. 
(2016) find that client conditional conservatism is negatively related to the incidence of going-
concern opinions and auditor resignation. Using the exogenous shock of the collapse of Andersen 
in 2001, Krishnan (2007) examines ex-Andersen clients and finds that timely loss recognition 
increased under the auditor replacing Andersen. This evidence supports the conjecture that auditors 
of clients suspected of aggressive accounting require more conservative reporting. 
Fees and Audit Quality 
Several prior studies view abnormal fees as a measure of independence in appearance 
(Dopuch, King, and Schwartz 2003; Francis and Ke 2006). Consistent with the economic-bond 
hypothesis, Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson (2002) document a positive association between non-
audit fees and abnormal accruals. Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew (2003) and Chung and 
Kallapur (2003), on the other hand, do not find such an association. Srinidhi and Gul (2007) find 
for the pre-SOX period (2000-2001) that higher audit (non-audit) fees are associated with lower 
(higher) abnormal accruals, and conclude high audit fees represent audit effort, whereas high non-
audit fees suggest an economic bond. Choi, Kim, and Zang (2010), also for the pre-SOX period 
(2000–2003), find that high abnormal audit fees are associated with larger absolute and signed 
abnormal accruals. Hoitash, Markelevich, and Barragato (2007) find similar results for the same 
period. Thus, whereas the results of Srinidhi and Gul (2007) suggest high audit fees capture audit 
effort, the findings of Choi et al. (2010) and Hoitash et al. (2007) suggest such high fees create an 
economic bond. By contrast, Larcker and Richardson (2004) find evidence of a negative relation 
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between abnormal audit and non-audit fees and abnormal accruals. They argue that reputation 
concerns discipline auditors who exert more audit effort. Kinney, Palmrose, and Scholz (2004) 
find mixed results for the relation between non-audit fees and restatements, whereas DeFond, 
Raghunandan, and Subramanyam (2002) and Craswell, Stokes, and Laughton (2002) find no effect 
of fees on the propensity of auditors to issue going-concern or qualified opinions. Hribar et al. 
(2014) posit that abnormal audit fees arise when reporting quality is poor, so audit effort, as 
reflected in higher fees, is auditors’ reaction to accounting problems.  
SOX-related Studies 
Following major accounting scandals and audit failures, US Congress enacted SOX in 2002. 
However, the bulk of prior research that was available to Congress in 2002 had failed to establish 
that non-audit services in the pre-SOX period impaired auditor independence. Recently, however, 
Causholli, Chambers, and Payne (2014) find evidence that audit partners compromise 
independence in return for growth in non-audit services in the pre-SOX period. The PCAOB has 
expressed an ongoing concern about the effectiveness of SOX in resolving the fee-dependence 
problem (Doty 2011). 
SOX has changed the environment in which auditors and managers operate and interact 
(Landsman, Nelson, and Rountree 2009). Ghosh and Pawlewicz (2009) document a rise in audit 
fees between 2001 and 2005, suggesting greater audit effort, the pricing of higher litigation risk, a 
stronger economic bond, and/or higher initial SOX-implementation costs. Indeed, the extant 
literature seems to disagree on whether audit quality has improved since SOX. Supporting the view 
of poorer audit quality post-SOX, Blay and Geiger (2013) find that clients paying higher total fees 
in 2004–2006 were issued fewer going-concern modified opinions, but this finding does not hold 
in 2000. A few studies argue that audit quality may have declined post-SOX because the Act may 
have lowered auditor reputation risk under the less informative PCAOB-inspection regime 
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(Lennox and Pittman 2010) relative to the previous peer-review regime (Hilary and Lennox 2005). 
Another reason for suspecting a weaker inspection regime is that the PCAOB’s inspectors are not 
professional accountants (DeFond and Zhang 2014). 
DeFond and Lennox (2011) examine a small sample of small auditors who exited the audit 
market in 2002–2008. Their findings suggest audit quality increased post-SOX as the number of 
auditors decreased following SOX. SOX could also have affected the demand for high-quality 
external audit by changing the rules on the composition of audit committees, requiring more 
independence and financial and legal expertise of the committee members. Krishnan, Wen, and 
Zhao (2011) examine one year before and one year after SOX and provide evidence indicating 
these changes to corporate governance have been successful. 
Several studies have raised the concern that the abovementioned effects of SOX were short- 
lived and possibly not driven by the Act itself, but by high media and public attention. For example, 
Feldman and Read (2010) document an initial increase in the rate of modified audit opinions in 
2002–2003, but this rate reverted to pre-Enron levels in subsequent years. Kao et al. (2014) use a 
longer time series and do not find a strong association between fees and the incidence of going-
concern opinions. 
In sum, prior research provides inconclusive evidence that SOX was needed and whether 
any effects on auditors detected in early years persist. Importantly, many of the abovementioned 
studies have used relatively short time series following SOX, which implies the long-term effects 
of SOX on auditors are yet to be investigated.5 
Auditor-Client Conflict over Loss Recognition 
                                                     
5 For example, Ashbaugh et al. (2003) use a single year (2000), Larcker and Richardson (2004) analyze two years 
(2000–2001), Li (2009) analyzes three years (2001–2003), Blankley, Hurtt, and MacGregor (2012) use a sample 
period of eight years (2002–2009), and Kao et al. (2014) also analyze a sample period of eight years (2001 and 2003–
2009). 
10 
 
By delaying the recognition of losses, managers decrease transaction costs with stakeholders 
and regulators (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Beatty and Liao 2011), or gain certain personal 
benefits (Kothari et al. 2009). Several studies provide evidence consistent with delayed loss 
recognition (e.g., Alciatore, Easton, and Spear 2000; Hirschey and Richardson 2002) and avoiding 
the reporting of negative earnings (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser 
1999). However, delayed loss recognition may lead to litigation, which provides a countervailing 
incentive to managers to report them in a timely fashion (Skinner 1994, 1997; Kasznik and Lev 
1995; Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough 2002). Managers, nonetheless, may reduce the effect of 
litigation by purchasing directors’ and officers’ liability insurance. Consistent with this conjecture, 
Chung and Wynn (2008) find evidence of delayed loss recognition in companies whose managers 
purchase insurance against litigation.  
Watts (2003) argues that, in contrast to managers, external auditors prefer timely loss 
recognition because it helps them maintain their good reputation and avoid litigation. Absent any 
distortive incentive, auditors do not gain any additional benefit from aggressive reporting that 
overstates the client’s financial performance and position. In particular, quantifying damages is 
easier when financial statements overstate rather than understate net assets and profitability 
(Skinner 1994, 1997). Hence, due to reputation concerns and litigation risk, auditors should ensure 
delayed loss recognition by their clients is justified. However, auditor incentives to secure high 
non-audit fees may compromise auditor independence. 
Although many studies use abnormal accruals as a measure of audit quality, abnormal 
accruals may not capture the auditor-client conflict over the timeliness of loss recognition in 
earnings or accruals. The exception is Ruddock, Taylor, and Taylor (2006), who examine whether 
abnormally high non-audit fees in Australia are associated with timely loss recognition in earnings, 
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albeit in a pre-SOX period. Their findings do not support the notion that the economic bond results 
in slower loss recognition. 
  
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Measures of Abnormal Fees and Their Interpretation 
We use three measures of abnormal fees (ABFEE): abnormal audit fees (ABLAF), abnormal 
non-audit fees (ABLNAF), and abnormal total fees (ABLTF). We regress each fee measure (in log 
transformation) on a large number of variables identified by prior studies, and use the regression 
residuals as a measure of abnormal fees, where positive (negative) residuals represent overpayment 
(underpayment) relative to normal fees. Appendix 2 provides details on the models and variable 
definitions.  
Abnormal fees can be interpreted in different ways. First, high (i.e., positive) abnormal audit 
fees may be viewed as reflecting additional audit effort needed to resolve reporting problems 
(Hribar et al. 2014) and maintain reputation (Larcker and Richardson 2004). In our context, 
auditors exert effort in verifying delayed loss recognition. A contrasting view of abnormal audit 
effort is that it should lead to faster loss recognition.  
Alternatively, high abnormal audit fees may represent a fee premium relating to unobserved 
client risk (Doogar, Sivadasan, and Solomon 2015). One possible manifestation of client risk is 
under-reporting of loss events. However, as Doogar et al. (2015) argue, client risk is likely a 
permanent (i.e., time invariant) determinant of fees. We control for this persistence in two ways. 
First, we include a lagged residual in the fee model, following Doogar et al. (2015) (see Appendix 
2). Second, we use firm fixed effects in the main regressions to control for unobserved omitted 
correlated variables that are time invariant (e.g., underlying audit risk). 
12 
 
High abnormal non-audit fees are a proxy for economic bond (Knechel 2015), which may 
impair auditor independence (Frankel et al. 2002; Causholli et al. 2014). Finding that high 
abnormal non-audit fees are associated with slower loss recognition would support the economic-
bond hypothesis.  
High abnormal audit fees may also represent an economic bond, and without observing billed 
hours, one cannot safely rule out this possibility. Cameran, Francis, Marra, and Pettinicchio (2015) 
obtain confidential data on billed hours and find that audit fees and audit hours are highly positively 
correlated, suggesting abnormal audit fees is a proxy for audit effort rather than economic bond. 
Abnormal Fees and Timely Loss Recognition in Accruals  
Following Ball and Shivakumar (2006), we use the Jones (1991) model to detect timely loss 
recognition in the accruals-generating process: 
0 1 2 3 4 5t t t t t t t tACCR DCF CF DCF CF REV GPPEβ β β β β β η= + + + ∗ + ∆ + +  (Jones) 
ACCR is total accruals, defined as net income minus cash flow from operations. CF denotes 
operating cash flows, DCF is an indicator variable for negative cash flows, and the interaction 
term DCF*CF captures the asymmetric loss recognition in accruals. The Jones model also includes 
change in revenues (∆REV), and gross property, plant, and equipment (GPPE). We deflate all 
amounts by average total assets. We expect the coefficient on CF, β2, to be negative, because 
accruals essentially allocate current cash flows to non-current periods. We expect the coefficient 
on DCF*CF, β3, to be positive due to conservative accounting (Ball and Shivakumar 2006). If a 
negative shock in current cash flows is correlated with future declines in cash flows, conservative 
accounting works to reduce current accruals. Finally, we expect accruals to be positively 
(negatively) related to ∆REV (GPPE). 
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We add six control variables to the above baseline model (Control): (i) firm size (SIZE), 
because larger firms report less conservatively (LaFond and Roychowdhury 2008; LaFond and 
Watts 2008); (ii) book-to-market ratio (BM), following Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) and Hui, 
Klasa, and Young (2012); (iii) leverage (LEV), to capture the demand for conservatism by creditors 
and to avoid overestimating conditional conservatism in the presence of debt (Amir, Guan, and 
Livne 2010); (iv) stock return volatility (RISK) following LaFond and Watts (2008); (v) firm age 
(AGE) following Khan and Watts (2009); (vi) and industry-based litigation risk (LIT) (Francis, 
Philbrick, and Schipper 1994; Kim and Skinner 2012). These six control variables enter the model 
on a standalone basis and with their interactions with DCF, CF, and DCF*CF. We also include 
year and firm fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity.6 We cluster the standard errors 
by firm and year following Petersen (2009). 
To examine the effect of abnormal fees on timely loss recognition, we further augment the 
model as follows: 
       
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8
9 10
11
            * + * *
            * * + * *
            * *
Pos
t t t t t t t
Pos
t t t t t t
Pos
t t t t t t
Pos
t t
ACCR DCF CF DCF CF ABFEE ABFEE
ABFEE ABFEE ABFEE DCF ABFEE CF
ABFEE DCF CF ABFEE ABFEE DCF
ABFEE ABFEE C
β β β β β β
β β β
β β
β
= + + + ∗ + +
+ +
+
+ 12
20 26
13 14
15 21
32 38
27 33
+ * * *
            *
            * * * ,
Pos
t t t t t
t t j jt j jt t
j j
j jt t j jt t t t
j j
F ABFEE ABFEE DCF CF
REV GPPE Control Control DCF
Control CF Control DCF CF Years Firms
β
β β β β
β β ε
= =
= =
+ ∆ + + +
+ + + + +
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
        (1) 
where ABFEE is abnormal fee, measured as residual audit fee (ABLAF), residual non-audit fee 
(ABLNAF), and residual total fee (ABLTF), respectively. Following Choi et al. (2010), we allow 
                                                     
6 Because we use firm fixed effects, LIT drops out as a standalone variable, but it appears in the interactions. 
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the coefficient on ABFEE*DCF*CF to vary between positive and negative abnormal-fee 
measures. ABFEEPos is an indicator variable equal to one for positive ABFEE, and zero otherwise. 
In equation (1), finding a positive coefficient on DCF*CF, β3, suggests timely loss 
recognition in accruals. A positive (negative) β9 indicates faster (slower) loss recognition for 
negative ABFEE. β12 captures the incremental speed of timely loss recognition of positive ABFEE 
over that of negative ABFEE. Finally, a positive value of the sum of β9 and β12 is consistent with 
timely loss recognition for positive abnormal fees. We focus on this sum because positive 
abnormal fees capture unusual audit effort in audit fees and an economic bond in non-audit fees. 
 
SAMPLE, DATA, AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The sample includes observations with financial data available on COMPUSTAT, data on 
audit and non-audit fees available on the Audit Analytics (AA) database, and stock returns 
available on CRSP (see Panel A of Table 1). We exclude financial institutions and regulated 
utilities because their financial statements are markedly different, resulting in different types of 
accruals and cash flows. Because fee data are available on the AA database only from 2000 
onward, the initial sample contains 59,703 firm-year observations over the period 2000–2015. This 
sample decreases by (i) 10,645 firm-year observations owing to missing financial data necessary 
for calculating abnormal fees and (ii) 7,440 firm-year observations due to the inclusion of lagged 
residuals in the fee models. It is further reduced by 128 observations due to missing data needed 
for the main estimation models. We further exclude 5,475 observations for the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC) period 2008–2009 in the main analyses because of the special nature of those years. 
Our final sample comprises 36,015 firm-year observations. 
Panel B of Table 1 presents means of inflation-adjusted fees by year for 2000–2015 (59,703 
firm-year observations). Audit fees exhibit large real increases up to 2006, whereas non-audit fees 
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decline significantly up to 2009. The sharpest increase (decrease) in audit (non-audit) fees is in 
2004 (2002) by 55% (25%). These observations are consistent with the effects of SOX, including 
curtailment of non-audit services and the greater cost of audit-related work. The pattern in total 
fees is more moderate, with the exception of 2004. This moderation occurs because of the often-
contrasting trends in audit fees and non-audit fees. 
(Table 1 about here) 
Panel A of Table 2 reports means of variables used in the timely loss-recognition models for 
our final sample. Although SOX was enacted in mid-2002, the SEC had the task of setting detailed 
regulation in place, which took some time to execute. One of the most important rules of the Act 
that concerns auditors is Section 404 (reporting on the effectiveness of controls over financial 
reporting), which came into effect in 2004. We therefore define 2001–2003 as the pre-SOX period, 
and the remaining years as the post-SOX period (2004–2007 and 2010–2015). Panel A shows that 
audit fees and total fees are higher in the post-SOX period, and that non-audit fees are lower in the 
post-SOX period. The abnormal-fee measures are indistinguishable between the subperiods by 
construction. With respect to other variables, several differences exist across the subperiods. 
Interestingly, mean accruals (ACCR) are negative in the entire sample, consistent with 
conservative reporting. However, financial reporting is less conservative post-SOX (at the 0.01 
level). 
Panel B compares variable means between Negative and Positive abnormal-fee groups. 
Naturally, the various fee measures are largely higher for the Positive group than the Negative 
group. Accruals are statistically indistinguishable between the Positive and Negative groups. The 
table also reveals that smaller and older firms (SIZE, AGE), firms with less current cash flows 
(CF), higher book-to-market ratios (BM), higher leverage (LEV), higher revenue increases (∆REV), 
or more long-term assets (GPPE) are associated with positive abnormal fees. 
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Panel C of Table 2 reports the correlation matrix for the abnormal-fee variables and other 
variables used in our analyses. The correlation between abnormal audit fees and abnormal non-
audit fees is positive but rather small. The correlation between abnormal total fees and abnormal 
audit fees is high, because total fees are the sum of audit and non-audit fees, and audit fees have 
become the largest fee component over time. Importantly, accruals and the three abnormal-fee 
measures are uncorrelated. This initial evidence does not support the view that abnormal fees are 
related to accruals.  
(Table 2 about here) 
RESULTS 
Timely Loss Recognition 
Table 3 reports the results of estimating equation (1). For brevity, we report only a subset of 
estimated coefficients across three pairs of columns: abnormal audit fee (ABLAF), abnormal non-
audit fee (ABLNAF), and abnormal total fee (ABLTF). Within each pair, we distinguish between 
the pre-SOX and post-SOX periods. The coefficient on DCF*CF, capturing the underlying speed 
of timely loss recognition (i.e., a measure of the client’s timely loss recognition before the 
incremental effect of the auditor and the effect of Control), is positive and highly significant only 
in the post-SOX period and across all abnormal-fee measures.  
The variables of main interest are the interactive terms ABFEE*DCF*CF and 
ABFEE*ABFEEPos*DCF*CF. In the pre-SOX period, none of the coefficients on 
ABFEE*DCF*CF or ABFEE*ABFEEPos*DCF*CF is statistically significant, implying that 
negative abnormal fees are unrelated to timely loss recognition and that no incremental effect is 
present for positive abnormal fees. In the post-SOX period, the coefficient on ABFEE*DCF*CF 
is negative and significant at the 8% level only in the last column, suggesting slower loss 
recognition as abnormal total fees become less negative. With respect to the coefficient on 
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ABFEE*ABFEEPos*DCF*CF, which captures the incremental effect of positive abnormal fees, it 
is negative only for abnormal audit fees post-SOX (p-value = 0.08). The results suggest slower 
loss recognition post-SOX when abnormal audit fees are positive than when they are negative. The 
sum of the coefficients on ABFEE*DCF*CF and ABFEE*ABFEEPos*DCF*CF is negative only 
for abnormal total fees (p-value = 0.09), consistent with slower loss recognition post-SOX in the 
presence of positive abnormal total fees.  
At the bottom of the table, we report the results of the tests comparing the main coefficients 
between the pre- and post-SOX periods. Positive abnormal audit fees are associated with slower 
loss recognition post-SOX than pre-SOX (p-value = 0.07). For positive abnormal total fees, the 
speed of loss recognition is slower post-SOX but the difference is again marginally significant (p-
value = 0.10).7  
Overall, we find some evidence that abnormal fees are related to timely loss recognition and 
no evidence that abnormal non-audit fees are related to timely loss recognition. In addition, we 
find weak evidence that the pre- and post-SOX periods exhibit different speeds of loss recognition 
for positive abnormal audit and total fees. 
With regards to the six control variables and the related interaction terms, we find the 
coefficients on LEV*DCF*CF are positive and significant at the conventional levels in four out of 
the six regressions. The findings are consistent with the view that higher-leveraged firms recognize 
losses in accruals in a timelier manner because creditors demand accounting conservatism. We 
also find the coefficients on LIT*DCF*CF are positive and significant at the conventional levels 
in all regressions, suggesting litigation risk is a major concern for determining the degree of 
                                                     
7 Adding change in sales, an indicator for negative change in sales, and an interaction term between these two variables 
(Banker et al. 2016; Banker et al. 2017) does not change the results. 
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reporting conservatism. We find no evidence that firm size, book-to-market ratio, firm risk, or firm 
age is related to reporting conservatism.  
(Table 3 about here) 
We perform a number of contextual analyses to deepen the analysis presented in Table 3. 
First, we examine whether the relation between abnormal positive fees and timely loss recognition 
is more pronounced when firms issue new equity or debt. Auditors may be under greater pressure 
from managers and the public when the audit client raises capital (Venkataraman, Weber, and 
Willenborg 2008; Amir et al. 2010). We construct an indicator variable (FIN) that takes the value 
of one for substantial external financing whereby the number of shares increases by at least 10%, 
or long-term debt by at least 20%, and zero otherwise. 
Second, we examine whether the auditor’s industry specialization affects the relation 
between positive abnormal fees and timely loss recognition. Prior research suggests audit quality 
is positively related to the auditor’s industry expertise (e.g., Balsam, Krishnan, and Yang 2003; 
Burnett, Cripe, Martin, and McAllister 2012). Lacking deep industry-specific knowledge likely 
requires more audit effort from auditors. Following Burnett et al. (2012), we define an indicator 
variable, SPECIALIST, that takes the value of one when the audit firm has the largest market share 
of audit fees by at least 10% within a 2-digit SIC, and zero otherwise.  
Finally, we distinguish between Big-4 and non-Big-4 auditors. A common argument in the 
literature is that audit quality is positively related to auditor size (DeAngelo 1981). Early research 
has also found that audit fees are associated with auditor size (Palmrose 1986), suggesting high 
fees may result from high effort input in the auditing process by large auditors, in part to protect 
against loss of reputation and a higher likelihood of litigation. Similarly, we define an indicator 
variable, BIG4, taking the value of one for Big-4 auditors, and zero otherwise. 
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We repeat the analyses in Table 3 by using the above three indicator variables as partition 
variables, and then examine whether the relation between positive abnormal fees and timely loss 
recognition differs between the two subsamples. The results (untabulated) show that, for clients 
raising substantial external capital, positive abnormal fees are associated with slower loss 
recognition post-SOX across all abnormal-fee types (p-values = 0.01, 0.00, and 0.01, respectively). 
The pre- versus post-SOX comparisons further show that, for the capital-raising subsample, the 
association between positive abnormal fees and timely loss recognition significantly differs across 
the two periods (p-values = 0.05, 0.00, and 0.08, respectively).  
Turning to auditor industry specialization, we find that positive abnormal audit fees and 
abnormal total fees are associated with slower loss recognition in the post-SOX period than in the 
pre-SOX period, when the auditor is not a specialist. This finding is most pronounced for abnormal 
audit fees (p-values = 0.03). Finally, the results are weak and mixed for auditor size. Positive 
abnormal non-audit (total) fees are associated with slower loss recognition post-SOX for Big-4 
(non-Big-4) auditors. The test of the difference between the pre-SOX period and the post-SOX 
period for these two abnormal fee measures are margina (p-values of 0.10 and 0.08, respectively).  
Overall, we conclude that positive abnormal audit fees are associated with slower loss 
recognition in the post-SOX period to a greater extent than in the pre-SOX period in capital-raising 
firms, and when the auditor is not an industry specialist. The results for non-audit fees are mixed. 
C_Score  
An alternative measure of timely loss recognition is the firm-level C_Score (Kahn and Watts 
2009). We first calculate the median and mean C_Score for each subperiod, grouped by positive 
and negative abnormal fees. Untabulated univariate analyses reveal the median and average 
C_Score are lower in the positive abnormal-fee groups than in the negative abnormal-fee groups 
for ABLAF and ABLNAF in both the pre- and post-SOX periods. The differences are also highly 
20 
 
significant (p-values = 0.00). With regards to ABLTF, the C_Scores are lower for positive 
abnormal fees than negative abnormal fees only in the pre-SOX period (p-value for difference in 
means = 0.05; p-value for difference in medians = 0.01). Regardless of the fee measure used, the 
median and mean C_Scores are lower post-SOX than pre-SOX for both the positive and negative 
abnormal-fee groups. Taken together, these results indicate slower loss recognition for higher-
abnormal-fee measures and overall slower loss recognition post-SOX.  
We also regress changes in C_Score on changes in abnormal fees. We use a model similar 
to that used by Ramalingegowda and Yu (2012): 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6
_
                
t t t t t t
t t
C Score ABFEE SIZE BM LEV RISK
AGE Years
β β β β β β
β ε
∆ = + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆
+ ∆ + +
.  (2) 
All variables are defined as before. The model includes year fixed effects, but not firm fixed 
effects, owing to the changes specification we use. The results, reported in Table 4, suggest an 
increase in abnormal audit or total fees is positively related to the change in C_Score pre-SOX. By 
contrast, an increase in abnormal audit or total fees is negatively related to the change in C_Score 
post-SOX. The differences in the coefficient on ΔABFEE between the pre- and post-SOX period 
are also statistically significant for both fee measures (p-values = 0.00). We find no association 
between changes in abnormal non-audit fees and changes in C_Scores. Overall, the results suggest 
greater audit effort is associated with decreased reporting conservatism, measured by C_Score in 
the post-SOX period. 
As to the controls, we find that changes in firm size (leverage) are strongly and negatively 
(positively) related to changes in the speed of loss recognition across all fee measures and periods. 
Changes in firm risk (firm age) are strongly and positively (negatively) related to changes in the 
speed of loss recognition in the pre-SOX period only. We find mixed evidence on the association 
between changes in the book-to-market ratio and changes in C_Score. 
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(Table 4 about here) 
Discretionary Accruals  
Prior studies have examined the relation between abnormal accruals and various fee 
measures, although for short periods. Ashbaugh et al. (2003), for instance, examine the association 
between performance-adjusted abnormal accruals and several fee measures, using data from only 
the year 2000. Although abnormal accruals and timely loss recognition in total accruals likely 
capture different aspects of accounting quality, for completeness and comparison with prior 
research, we also examine the association between abnormal accruals and our abnormal-fee 
measures. 
In Table 5, we use a model similar to that of Ashbaugh et al. (2003), replacing their fee 
measures with our abnormal-fee measures. We also allow the coefficient on abnormal fees to vary 
between negative and positive values (Choi et al. 2010). The dependent variable is the absolute 
value of the discretionary element in current accruals after adjusting for performance, as derived 
in equations (4) and (5) in Ashbaugh et al. (2003).8 Starting with abnormal audit fees, in both 
periods, we find no relation between the negative abnormal audit fees and absolute discretionary 
accruals. The incremental effect of positive abnormal audit fees is positive and significant in the 
post-SOX period only. Moreover, as reported at the bottom of the table, the coefficient on ABFEE 
+ ABFEE*ABFEEPos is positive and highly significant (0.004; p-value = 0.00), and statistically 
larger post-SOX than its value pre-SOX (p-value = 0.03). 
The results in the middle two columns reveal no relation between negative abnormal non-
audit fees and absolute discretionary accruals in either period, because the coefficients on ABFEE 
                                                     
8 We also include firm fixed effects. Because Ashabuagh et al. (2003) use a single year, firm fixed effects are 
irrelevant. Choi et al. (2010) examine a longer period (2000–2003), but only control for industry fixed effects. 
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are not statistically different from zero. In addition, we find no evidence of a significant relation 
between positive abnormal non-audit fees and absolute abnormal accruals in either period. 
The rightmost pair of columns report the results for abnormal total fees. Consistent with 
abnormal audit fees, the incremental effect of positive abnormal total fees on absolute abnormal 
accruals is positive post-SOX (p-value = 0.00). We also find that positive abnormal total fees are 
positively related to absolute abnormal accruals post-SOX (coefficient on ABFEE + 
ABFEE*ABFEEPos = 0.005, p-value = 0.00). However, the pre- versus post-SOX difference is 
insignificant. Overall, the results in this panel suggest positive abnormal audit and total fees are 
positively related to the magnitude of discretionary accruals in the post-SOX period. Although we 
do not find similar relations pre-SOX, the two periods are statistically different only in the case of 
positive abnormal audit fees.9  
(Table 5 about here) 
Ashbaugh et al. (2003) also examine the relation between fee measures and signed abnormal 
accruals. They find no relation between their fee measures and income-increasing abnormal 
accruals. However, they find a negative relation between a higher ratio of non-audit fees to total 
fees and income-decreasing abnormal accruals. In Table 6, we repeat the analyses in Table 5 but 
distinguish between positive (Panel A) and negative (Panel B) abnormal accruals.  
In Panel A, we find no significant association between positive (income-increasing) 
abnormal accruals and abnormal audit fees. The results reveal a negative association between 
positive abnormal accruals and positive abnormal non-audit fees post-SOX (ABFEE + ABFEE* 
ABFEEPos = -0.001, p-value = 0.02). That is, after SOX, when positive abnormal non-audit fees 
become larger, income-increasing abnormal accruals decrease. Finally, we find a positive effect 
                                                     
9 The finding that positive abnormal fees are unrelated to absolute discretionary accruals pre-SOX stands in contrast 
to the positive relation reported by Choi et al. (2010) for the years 2000–2003. 
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of abnormal total fees on abnormal accruals post-SOX, as indicated by the significantly positive 
coefficient on ABFEE + ABFEE* ABFEEPos (0.003, p-value = 0.03). The test of this coefficient 
equality between the two periods reports a p-value of 0.06. 
Panel B shows that in the post-SOX period, positive abnormal audit fees are negatively 
related to negative abnormal accruals (ABFEE + ABFEE*ABFEEPos = -0.005, p-value = 0.02). 
Similar result holds, albeit more moderately, for positive abnormal total fees (coefficient = -0.005, 
p-value = 0.06). These results suggest that, as these abnormal-fee measures increase, abnormal 
accruals become more negative in the post-SOX period. However, the difference in the value of 
the coefficient for ABFEE + ABFEE*ABFEEPos between the two periods is insignificant across all 
three abnormal-fee types.  
Overall, the evidence in Tables 5 and 6 on the relation between abnormal fees and the 
magnitude of absolute accruals is mixed and inconclusive. The strength of the findings varies with 
the sign of abnormal accruals and the period examined. 
(Table 6 about here) 
SUMMARY 
We provide evidence on the relations between abnormal audit, non-audit and total fees and 
timely loss recognition in the post-SOX period. We extend the literature on the consequences of 
SOX by examining these relations using a 13-year period, which spans the pre-SOX period of 
2001–2003 and the post-SOX period of 2004–2015, excluding the financial crisis years of 2008–
2009. In the entire sample using the Ball and Shivakumar (2006) model, we find weak evidence 
that loss recognition in accruals is less timely post-SOX than pre-SOX when abnormal audit or 
total fees are positive. Conducting several contextual analyses, in the post-SOX period we find 
slower loss recognition is associated with abnormal positive audit fees when the client raises 
substantial external capital or when the auditor is not an industry specialist. The evidence suggests 
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that auditors exert effort to verify delayed losses when auditors are under greater pressure to 
perform high-quality audits. Using the firm-level C_Score as an alternative measure of timely loss 
recognition, we find that higher abnormal audit and total fees are negatively related to C_Score 
post-SOX, but that these relations are positive pre-SOX. Finally, we estimate the relations between 
abnormal fees and abnormal accruals and find mixed and inconclusive evidence on the relation 
between abnormal fees and the magnitude of absolute accruals. 
Overall, our results are consistent with the view that auditors exert greater effort in verifying 
delayed loss recognition post-SOX. In the analysis of non-audit fees, we find no support for the 
economic-bond hypothesis. To the best of our knowledge, Ruddock et al. (2006) is the only study 
that examines the association between abnormal non-audit fees and timely loss recognition. Their 
focus was on the period before SOX in Australia. Like us, they find no evidence that non-audit 
fees are associated with timely loss recognition. In contrast, our main result is that additional audit 
effort is exerted in verifying delayed loss recognition post-SOX, but not before. 
Our study is subject to three caveats. First, estimating abnormal fee models depends on 
correctly specifying expected fee models. Second, positive abnormal audit and non-audit fees may 
be inaccurate measures of additional audit effort and economic bond, respectively. Audit hours is 
possibly a more accurate measure of audit effort. In addition, there could be other links between 
auditors and their clients not captured by non-audit services. Third, any detected differences 
between the pre- and post-SOX periods may not be exclusively attributed to SOX, but to other 
legislations and events during the same period (e.g., the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010).  
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Table 1 
Sample Selection and Fee Trend 
Panel A: Sample Selection  
 
Initial sample: Intersection of Audit Analytics, Compustat, and CRSP 
2000-2015 
88,384 
Less: utilities and financial firms (28,681) 
 59,703 
Less: missing financial data for estimating economic bond (10,645) 
 49,058 
Less: missing lagged residuals for estimating economic bond  (7,440) 
 41,618 
Less: missing financial data for timely loss recognition model     (128) 
Final Sample before the exclusion of 2008–2009  41,490 
Less: The Global Financial Crisis 2008–2009 (5,475) 
Final Sample 36,015 
 
Panel B: Audit Fees, Non-audit Fees, and Total Fees by Year 
 
Year Obs. Audit Fees 
($000) 
Non-Audit Fees 
($000) 
Total Fees  
($000) 
  Mean Change Mean Change Mean Change 
2000 2,889 508  1,156  1,664  
2001 3,988 512 1% 1,080 -7% 1,592 -4% 
2002 4,200 722 41% 814 -25% 1,536 -4% 
2003 4,112 938 30% 680 -17% 1,618 5% 
2004 4,139 1,458 55% 582 -14% 2,040 26% 
2005 4,102 1,657 14% 480 -17% 2,138 5% 
2006 4,046 1,792 8% 437 -9% 2,229 4% 
2007 3,985 1,732 -3% 440 1% 2,172 -3% 
2008 3,699 1,751 1% 416 -6% 2,166 0% 
2009 3,508 1,668 -5% 372 -11% 2,039 -6% 
2010 3,527 1,635 -2% 406 9% 2,041 0% 
2011 3,430 1,621 -1% 411 1% 2,032 0% 
2012 3,427 1,699 5% 435 6% 2,134 5% 
2013 3,471 1,730 2% 434 0% 2,165 1% 
2014 3,593 1,711 -1% 440 1% 2,150 -1% 
2015 3,587 1,753 2% 437 -1% 2,190 2% 
Total 59,703 1,429  563  1,991  
 
Panel A presents the sample selection criteria. Panel B presents the mean of audit fees, non-audit fees, and 
total fees (in $000) by year for all firms with available fee data. All fees, obtained from the Audit Analytics 
database, are inflation adjusted using 2000 as the base year. We obtain the consumer price index from 
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt. 
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Table 2 
Variable Means and Correlations 
 
Panel A: Variable Means by Period 
 
 Full 
Sample 
 
Pre-SOX 
2001-03 
Post-SOX excluding 
GFC (2004-07 & 
2010-15) 
Test of 
Difference in 
Means 
 N=36,015 N=7,951 N=28,064 p-value 
LAF 13.29 12.56 13.49 0.00 
LNAF 10.62 11.45 10.39 0.00 
LTF 13.60 13.14 13.73 0.00 
ABLAF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.53 
ABLNAF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.84 
ABLTF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.74 
ACCR -0.07 -0.10 -0.06 0.00 
CF 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.00 
DCF 0.20 0.24 0.19 0.00 
SIZE 6.24 5.47 6.45 0.00 
BM 0.69 0.78 0.67 0.00 
LEV 0.61 0.82 0.55 0.00 
RISK 0.15 0.20 0.14 0.00 
AGE 31.20 27.78 32.17 0.00 
LIT 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.01 
∆REV 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.00 
GPPE 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.09 
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Panel B: Variable Means by Fee Type 
 
 ABLAF ABLNAF ABLTF 
 Negative  
(16,684 
obs.) 
Positive 
(19,331 
obs.) 
Negative 
(13,499 
obs.) 
Positive  
(22,516 
obs.) 
Negative  
(17,965 
obs.) 
Positive  
(18,050 
obs.) 
LAF 12.85 13.66*** 13.29 13.28 12.92 13.65*** 
LNAF 10.44 10.78*** 8.20 12.08*** 9.93 11.31*** 
LTF 13.25 13.90*** 13.45 13.69*** 13.22 13.98*** 
ABLAF -0.37 0.34*** -0.08 0.05*** -0.29 0.30*** 
ABLNAF -0.19 0.16*** -2.06 1.23*** -0.60 0.59*** 
ABLTF -0.27 0.24*** -0.19 0.12*** -0.30 0.31*** 
ACCR -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 
CF 0.06 0.05*** 0.06 0.05*** 0.06 0.05** 
DCF 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.20 
SIZE 6.34 6.15*** 6.42 6.13*** 6.27 6.21** 
BM 0.65 0.73*** 0.68 0.70*** 0.66 0.73*** 
LEV 0.56 0.65** 0.62 0.60 0.56 0.66*** 
RISK 0.15 0.15* 0.15 0.16*** 0.15 0.15 
AGE 30.86 31.50*** 31.39 31.09* 30.87 31.53*** 
LIT 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 
ΔREV 0.07 0.05*** 0.07 0.05*** 0.07 0.05*** 
GPPE 0.57 0.50*** 0.55 0.52*** 0.56 0.51*** 
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Panel C: Correlation Matrix 
 ABLAF ABLNAF ABLTF ACCR CF DCF SIZE BM LEV RISK AGE LIT ΔREV GPPE 
ABLAF  0.16 0.82 0.01 -0.09 0.01 -0.06 0.15 0.11 0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.07 -0.10 
ABLNAF 0.09  0.45 -0.02 -0.06 0.03 -0.12 0.05 0.04 0.06 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 
ABLTF 0.83 0.30  0.00 -0.07 -0.01 -0.02 0.11 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.08 
ACCR 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.25 0.06 0.09 -0.05 -0.07 -0.16 0.11 -0.06 0.18 -0.21 
CF -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.02  -0.70 0.41 -0.20 -0.09 -0.36 0.13 -0.14 0.22 0.24 
DCF 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.73  -0.38 -0.04 -0.11 0.39 -0.19 0.22 -0.15 -0.21 
SIZE -0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.14 0.37 -0.37  -0.31 0.06 -0.54 0.22 -0.08 0.16 0.07 
BM 0.11 0.00 0.08 -0.07 0.00 -0.02 -0.34  0.42 0.09 0.07 -0.27 -0.22 0.17 
LEV 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.09 -0.02 0.02 -0.11 0.14  -0.05 0.09 -0.29 -0.11 0.31 
RISK 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.20 -0.38 0.39 -0.46 0.07 0.09  -0.37 0.20 -0.07 -0.12 
AGE 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.14 -0.18 0.28 0.02 -0.02 -0.29  -0.20 -0.04 0.16 
LIT 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.24 0.22 -0.07 -0.24 -0.07 0.20 -0.18  -0.04 -0.36 
ΔREV -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 0.20 0.17 -0.13 0.15 -0.18 -0.06 -0.07 -0.03 -0.04  -0.02 
GPPE -0.08 -0.02 -0.07 -0.15 0.21 -0.19 0.06 0.15 0.08 -0.09 0.11 -0.32 -0.02  
 
Panel A presents means for the variables used in estimating equation (1). We partition the entire sample into two subperiods: (1) the pre-SOX period 
(2001–2003) and (2) the post-SOX period excluding GFC (2004–2007 and 2010–2015). We also report p-values for tests of differences in means. 
Panel B reports means for the variables based on the positive/negative abnormal fees. Panel C presents the Bonferroni-adjusted Pearson (Spearman) 
correlation coefficients below (above) the diagonal. We report correlations significant at the 0.10 level in boldface. We winsorize all continuous 
variables at 1% and 99%. See Appendix 1 for variable definitions.  
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Table 3 
Abnormal Fees and Timely Loss Recognition in Accruals 
 
 ABFEE=ABLAF ABFEE=ABLNAF ABFEE=ABLTF 
 2001-03 2004-07 
&2010-15 
2001-03 2004-07 
&2010-15 
2001-03 2004-07 
&2010-15 
       DCF 0.007 -0.036 -0.002 -0.033 0.010 -0.032 
 (0.78) (0.01) (0.93) (0.01) (0.70) (0.01) 
CF -0.826 -0.489 -0.771 -0.492 -0.766 -0.484 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DCF*CF 0.314 0.220 0.244 0.191 0.249 0.236 
 (0.07) (0.01) (0.17) (0.02) (0.16) (0.00) 
ABFEEPos  0.008 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.004 -0.003 
 (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.23) (0.25) (0.04) 
ABFEE 0.017 0.006 0.001 -0.000 0.013 0.011 
 (0.04) (0.21) (0.48) (0.53) (0.16) (0.04) 
ABFEE*DCF -0.015 -0.004 -0.000 0.003 -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.29) (0.57) (0.92) (0.00) (0.96) (0.70) 
ABFEE*CF -0.104 -0.028 -0.005 0.009 -0.039 -0.021 
 (0.06) (0.35) (0.63) (0.05) (0.51) (0.55) 
ABFEE*DCF*CF 0.166 -0.041 0.011 0.012 0.045 -0.074 
 (0.22) (0.25) (0.39) (0.32) (0.54) (0.08) 
ABFEE*ABFEEPos -0.015 0.007 -0.004 0.000 -0.008 0.007 
 (0.26) (0.32) (0.26) (1.00) (0.58) (0.41) 
ABFEE* ABFEEPos*DCF -0.009 -0.003 0.008 -0.004 -0.008 -0.023 
 (0.70) (0.77) (0.12) (0.06) (0.74) (0.08) 
ABFEE* ABFEEPos*CF 0.161 -0.026 0.007 -0.004 0.023 -0.068 
 (0.11) (0.61) (0.78) (0.65) (0.82) (0.25) 
ABFEE* ABFEEPos *DCF*CF 0.221 -0.059 -0.010 -0.013 0.101 -0.114 
 (0.55) (0.08) (0.71) (0.20) (0.43) (0.12) 
Year and firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 7,951 28,064 7,951 28,064 7,951 28,064 
Adj. R2 0.274 0.190 0.265 0.191 0.266 0.190 
ABFEE*DCF*CF 
+ABFEE*ABFEEPos*DCF*CF 
0.387 
(0.14) 
-0.100 
(0.29) 
0.001 
(0.98) 
-0.001 
(0.89) 
0.146 
(0.45) 
-0.188 
(0.09) 
Pre- vs. Post-SOX:    
ABFEE*DCF*CF 0.09 0.95 0.35 
ABFEE*ABFEEPos*DCF*CF 0.25 0.96 0.08 
ABFEE*DCF*CF 
+ABFEE*ABFEEPos*DCF*CF 0.07 0.97 0.10 
 
The table reports the results of estimating equation (1). For brevity, we report the results for the variables 
of our main interests only. ABFEE = {ABLAF, ANLNAF, ABLTF} is the fee residual from estimating the 
system of equations (A1)-(A3) (see Appendix 2). ABFEEPos = 1 if ABFEE > 0, and zero otherwise. We 
winsorize all continuous variables at 1% and 99%. We cluster the standard errors by firm and year (Petersen 
2009). We present p-values below the coefficient estimates in parentheses. For variable definitions, see 
Appendix 1. 
35 
 
Table 4 
Changes in C_Scores and Changes in Abnormal Fees  
 
 ABFEE=ABLAF ABFEE=ABLNAF ABFEE=ABLTF 
 2001-03 2004-07  
&2010-15 
2001-03 2004-07  
2010-15 
2001-03 2004-07  
&2010-15 
ΔABFEE 0.008 -0.006 -0.000 0.000 0.004 -0.004 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.97) (0.82) (0.04) (0.00) 
ΔSIZE -0.047 -0.065 -0.048 -0.065 -0.048 -0.065 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ΔBM -0.022 0.049 -0.020 0.049 -0.020 0.049 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
ΔLEV 0.048 0.003 0.047 0.003 0.047 0.003 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
ΔRISK 0.318 0.022 0.310 0.025 0.315 0.024 
 (0.00) (0.13) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00) (0.11) 
ΔAGE -0.206 -0.000 -0.202 -0.000 -0.214 -0.000 
 (0.03) (0.98) (0.03) (0.99) (0.02) (0.98) 
ΔABFEE (pre- vs. post-) 0.00 0.93 0.00 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 4,236 25,934 4,236 25,934 4,236 25,934 
Adj. R2 0.287 0.139 0.285 0.138 0.285 0.138 
 
The table reports the results of regressing changes in C_Scores on changes in abnormal fees (ABFEE), 
firm size (SIZE), book-to-market ratio (BM), leverage (LEV), firm risk (RISK), and firm age (AGE). 
Abnormal fees are the residuals from estimating the system of equations (A1)–(A3) (see Appendix 2). We 
winsorize all continuous variables at 1% and 99% and cluster the standard errors by firm and year (Petersen 
2009). p-values are below the coefficient estimates in parentheses. For variable definitions, see Appendix 
1. 
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Table 5 
Abnormal Fees and Absolute Abnormal Accruals 
 
 ABFEE=ABLAF ABFEE=ABLNAF ABFEE=ABLTF 
 2001-03 2004-07 
&2010-15 
2001-03 2004-07 
&2010-15 
2001-03 2004-07 
&2010-15 
ABFEEPos 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.99) (0.35) (0.47) (0.19) (0.30) (0.99) 
ABFEE 0.004 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.004 -0.003 
 (0.16) (0.85) (0.15) (0.97) (0.16) (0.07) 
ABFEE*ABFEEPos -0.007 0.004 0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.008 
 (0.08) (0.04) (0.08) (0.36) (0.70) (0.00) 
AUDDUM -0.003 0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.003 
 (0.00) (0.44) (0.00) (0.41) (0.00) (0.42) 
L1ACCRUAL 0.030 -0.002 0.031 -0.003 0.030 -0.003 
 (0.33) (0.01) (0.59) (0.02) (0.42) (0.01) 
MVE -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.20) (0.00) (0.24) (0.00) (0.24) (0.00) 
MERGER 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 (0.29) (0.01) (0.29) (0.02) (0.26) (0.02) 
FINANCING 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 (0.15) (0.00) (0.18) (0.00) (0.19) (0.00) 
LEVERAGE 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.64) (0.19) (0.71) (0.14) (0.73) (0.20) 
MB 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.004 
 (0.40) (0.00) (0.42) (0.00) (0.44) (0.00) 
INST_HOLDING -0.020 -0.022 -0.020 -0.022 -0.020 -0.022 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LOSS 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.005 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CFO -0.021 -0.000 -0.022 -0.000 -0.022 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.99) (0.00) (0.98)  (0.00)
  
(0.95) 
Year and firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ABFEE+ABFEE*ABFEEPos -0.003 (0.30) 
0.004 
(0.00) 
0.001 
(0.15) 
0.000 
(0.24) 
0.003 
(0.33) 
0.005 
(0.00) 
Pre- vs. Post-SOX:       
ABFEE 0.18 0.22 0.03 
ABFEE*ABFEEPos 0.02 0.25 0.04 
ABFEE+ABFEE*ABFEEPos 0.03 0.49 0.38 
Obs. 7,043 25,058 7,043 25,058 7,043 25,058 
Adj. R2 0.028 0.030 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.030 
 
The table replicates Ashbaugh et al. (2003) using their unsigned discretionary accruals (REDCA) as the 
dependent variable. REDCA is the discretionary current accruals controlling for performance by including 
the prior year’s return on assets in the estimation of expected accruals, as in equations (4) and (5) in 
Ashbaugh et al. (2003). The three ABFEE measures are abnormal audit fees (ABLAF), abnormal non-audit 
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fees (ABLNAF), and abnormal total fees (ABLTF) derived from estimating the system of equations (A1)-
(A3) (see Appendix 2). AUDDUM is an indicator variable for Big-4 auditors; L1ACCRUAL is last year’s 
total current accruals. MVE is the market value of equity; MERGER is an indicator variable for mergers 
and acquisitions; FINANCING is an indicator variable for debt and equity financing; LEVERAGE is 
financial leverage; MB is the market-to-book ratio; INST_HOLDING is the percentage of shares held by 
institutional owners; LOSS is an indicator variable for net loss; CFO is cash flow from operations. We 
measure all these control variables following Table 3 in Ashbaugh et al. (2003). We winsorize all 
continuous variables at 1% and 99%. We cluster the standard errors by firm and year (Petersen 2009). We 
present p-values below the coefficient estimates in parentheses. 
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Table 6 
Abnormal Fees and Signed Abnormal Accruals 
 
Panel A – Positive Abnormal Accruals 
 
 ABFEE=ABLAF ABFEE=ABLNAF ABFEE=ABLTF 
Pre-/Post-SOX Pre. Post. Pre. Post. Pre. Post. 
ABFEEPos -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.33) (0.87) (0.14) (0.99) (0.22) (0.13) 
ABFEE  0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.33) (0.32) (0.01) (0.20) (0.52) (0.37) 
ABFEE*ABFEEPos -0.002 0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.005 
 (0.55) (0.16) (0.21) (0.01) (0.70) (0.04) 
AUDDUM -0.000 0.003 0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.003 
 (0.02) (0.96) (0.99) (0.04) (0.02) (0.89) 
L1ACCRUAL -0.049 -0.043 -0.049 -0.043 -0.049 -0.043 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
MVE 0.006 -0.003 0.006 -0.003 0.006 -0.003 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
MERGER -0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.43) (0.97) (0.36) (0.94) (0.37) (0.93) 
FINANCING 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.16) (0.02) (0.16) (0.01) (0.17) (0.02) 
LEVERAGE 0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.003 
 (0.40) (0.01) (0.38) (0.01) (0.40) (0.01) 
MB 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.006 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
INST_HOLDING -0.007 -0.026 -0.007 -0.026 -0.007 -0.026 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
LOSS -0.018 -0.027 -0.018 -0.027 -0.018 -0.027 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CFO -0.238 -0.193 -0.239 -0.193 -0.238 -0.192 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year and firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ABFEE+ ABFEE*ABFEEPos 0.001 (0.83) 
0.001 
(0.28) 
-0.001 
(0.85) 
-0.001 
(0.02) 
-0.004 
(0.20) 
0.003 
(0.03) 
Pre- vs. Post-SOX:       
ABFEE 0.25 0.03 0.96 
ABFEE*ABFEEPos 0.31 0.11 0.23 
ABFEE+ ABFEE*ABFEEPos 0.76 0.49 0.06 
Obs. 3,828 13,520 3,828 13,520 3,828 13,520 
Adj. R2 0.223 0.186 0.224 0.186 0.223 0.186 
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Panel B – Negative Abnormal Accruals 
 
 ABFEE=ABLAF ABFEE=ABLNAF ABFEE=ABLTF 
Pre-/Post-SOX Pre. Post. Pre. Post. Pre. Post. 
ABFEEPos 0.002 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.003 -0.001 
 (0.39) (0.38) (0.99) (0.14) (0.10) (0.34) 
ABFEE  -0.005 -0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.013 0.002 
 (0.21) (0.40) (0.01) (0.75) (0.00) (0.32) 
ABFEE*ABFEEPos 0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 0.011 -0.007 
 (0.52) (0.41) (0.00) (0.16) (0.05) (0.05) 
AUDDUM 0.012 -0.001 0.009 -0.001 0.013 -0.001 
 (0.00) (0.54) (0.03) (0.56) (0.00) (0.59) 
L1ACCRUAL -0.091 -0.030 -0.093 -0.030 -0.091 -0.030 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
MVE 0.009 0.005 0.009 0.005 0.009 0.005 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
MERGER -0.009 -0.005 -0.009 -0.005 -0.010 -0.005 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
FINANCING -0.006 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.006 -0.003 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LEVERAGE 0.005 -0.004 0.005 -0.004 0.005 -0.004 
 (0.06) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) 
MB 0.003 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
INST_HOLDING 0.037 0.010 0.036 0.010 0.036 0.010 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LOSS -0.024 -0.038 -0.024 -0.037 -0.024 -0.038 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CFO -0.164 -0.169 -0.163 -0.169 -0.161 -0.169 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year and firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ABFEE+ABFEE*ABFEEPos -0.001 (0.65) 
-0.005 
(0.02) 
-0.002 
(0.03) 
-0.001 
(0.10) 
-0.002 
(0.72) 
-0.005 
(0.06) 
Pre- vs. Post-SOX:       
ABFEE 0.61 0.10 0.01 
ABFEE*ABFEEPos 0.47 0.13 0.03 
ABFEE+ABFEE*ABFEEPos 0.58 0.36 0.61 
Obs. 3,215 11,538 3,215 11,538 3,215 11,538 
Adj. R2 0.167 0.157 0.169 0.156 0.169 0.157 
 
The table replicates Ashbaugh et al. (2003) using their signed discretionary accruals (REDCA) as the 
dependent variable. REDCA is the discretionary current accruals controlling for performance by including 
the prior year’s return on assets in the estimation of expected accruals, as in equations (4) and (5) in 
Ashbaugh et al. (2003). Panel A (B) presents results for positive (negative) discretionary accruals. The 
three ABFEE measures are abnormal audit fees (ABLAF), abnormal non-audit fees (ABLNAF), and 
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abnormal total fees (ABLTF) derived from estimating the system of equations (A1)-(A3) (see Appendix 
2). AUDDUM is an indicator variable for Big-4 auditors; L1ACCRUAL is last year’s total current accruals. 
MVE is the market value of equity; MERGER is an indicator variable for mergers and acquisitions; 
FINANCING is an indicator variable for debt and equity financing; LEVERAGE is financial leverage; MB 
is the market-to-book ratio; INST_HOLDING is the percentage of shares held by institutional owners; 
LOSS is an indicator variable for net loss; CFO is cash flow from operations. We measure all these control 
variables following Table 3 in Ashbaugh et al. (2003). We winsorize all continuous variables at 1% and 
99%. We cluster the standard errors by firm and year (Petersen 2009). We present p-values below the 
coefficient estimates in parentheses. 
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Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
(Firm subscript i and year subscript t are omitted) 
Variable Definition 
Fee measures: 
LAF The natural logarithm of audit fees 
LNAF The natural logarithm of non-audit fees 
LTF The natural logarithm of total fees 
ABFEE Abnormal fees, measured by ABLAF, ABLNAF, and ABLTF as below 
ABFEEPos An indicator variable set to 1 if ABFEE > 0, and zero otherwise 
ABLAF Abnormal audit fee, measured by the residual of estimating equation (A1) in Appendix 2 
ABLNAF Abnormal non-audit fee, measured by the residual of estimating equation (A2) in Appendix 2 
ABLTF Abnormal total fee, measured by the residual of estimating equation (A3) in Appendix 2 
Independent variables used in the fee models (Appendix 2): 
ROA Return on assets, measured as net income divided by total assets 
SIZE The natural logarithm of market value of equity 
LEV Long-term plus short-term debt divided by market value of equity 
CRATIO Current assets divided by current liabilities 
INVREC Inventory plus accounts receivable divided by total assets 
CF Cash flows from operations divided by average total assets 
LOSS Indicator variable equal to one if the firm reports negative net income, and zero otherwise 
MRET Market-adjusted annual stock return 
SALESGRO Average percentage change in sales over the last three years  
MA Indicator variable equal to one if there is merger and acquisition activity, and zero otherwise 
SEG Number of business segments 
DAUD Indicator variable equal to one if the auditor is Big-4, and zero otherwise 
SW Indicator variable equal to one if there is an auditor switch, and zero otherwise 
OPIN Indicator variable equal to one if the firm receives a qualified opinion or an adverse opinion, and zero otherwise 
RESTAT Indicator variable equal to one if the firm has restated the retained earnings, and zero otherwise 
RISK Firm risk, measured as the standard deviation of monthly returns for the past 36 months 
LAG Reporting lag, measured as the number of days between fiscal year end and earnings announcement date 
FILER Indicator variable equal to one if the firm is an accelerated filer, and zero otherwise 
LIT 
litigation risk: an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is in the biotech 
(SIC codes 2833-2836, 8731-8734), computer (3570-3577 and 7370-7374), 
electronics (3600-3674), or retail (5200-5961) industry, and zero otherwise 
FORE Indicator variable equal to one if the firm has foreign operations, and zero otherwise 
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PLAN Indicator variable equal to one if the firm sponsors a defined benefit plan, and zero otherwise 
DISC Indicator variable equal to one if extraordinary items and discontinued operations exceed 1% of pre-tax income, and zero otherwise 
EMPL The natural logarithm of the number of employees 
FIN 
Indicator variable equal to one if there are no mergers and acquisitions and the 
number of shares outstanding increases by at least 10%, or long-term debt 
increases by at least 20%, and zero otherwise 
TAX Tax expense divided by pre-tax income 
LC_SCORE Firm-specific conservatism measured following Khan and Watts (2009) for the previous year 
1tε −  
The lagged residual from the first-step regressions of equations (A1)-(A3) in 
Appendix 2 
Variables used in equation (1) and definition of C_Score: 
ACCR Accruals, defined as net income minus cash flow from operations, scaled by average total assets 
DCF Indicator variable, equal to one if cash flow from operations is negative, and zero otherwise 
BM Book-to-market ratio, measured as book value of equity over market value of equity 
AGE Firm age, obtained from Professor Jay Ritter at University of Florida; if missing, measured as the number of years a firm is listed on CRSP 
∆REV Change in sales revenue, scaled by average total assets 
GPPE Gross property, plant, and equipment, scaled by average total assets 
  
C_Score Firm-specific conservatism measured following Khan and Watts (2009) for the current year 
 
Appendix 2: Fee Models 
The audit-fee model is 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11
12 13 14 15 16 17
18 19 20 21 22
23
t t t t t t
t t t t t t
t t t t t t
t t t t t
LAF ROA SIZE LEV CRATIO INVREC
CF LOSS MRET SALESGRO MA SEG
DAUD SW OPIN RESTAT RISK LAG
FILER LIT FORE PLAN DISC
β β β β β β
β β β β β β
β β β β β β
β β β β β
β
= + + + + +
+ + + + + +
+ + + + + +
+ + + + +
+ 24 25 26 1_t t t t tEMPL FIN LC SCOREβ β β ε ε−+ + + +
           (A1) 
The non-audit-fee model is 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11
12 13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20 21
22 23
t t t t t t
t t t t t t
t t t t t
t t t t t
t
LNAF ROA SIZE LEV CRATIO INVREC
CF LOSS MRET SALESGRO MA SEG
DAUD SW RESTAT RISK LIT
FORE PLAN DISC EMPL FIN
TAX
β β β β β β
β β β β β β
β β β β β
β β β β β
β β ε
= + + + + +
+ + + + + +
+ + + + +
+ + + + +
+ + 1t tε− +
           (A2) 
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The dependent variable in equations (A1)–(A2) is the natural logarithm of audit fees (LAF), 
and the natural logarithm of non-audit fees (LNAF), respectively. We also regress log of total fee 
(LTF) with similar independent variables. 
We measure all fee variables in inflation-adjusted dollars using 2000 as the base year. 
Appendix 1 provides related variable definitions. We estimate each equation annually and control 
for industry effects using the Fama and French 12-industry classification. To account for a possible 
common factor in the error term, we estimate these equations as one system using the seemingly 
unrelated regressions (SUR) technique. First, we estimate the SUR system annually without the 
lagged residual. Then we re-run the SUR system annually including the lagged residuals obtained 
from the first step.  
The audit-fee model (equation (A1)) shares most of the independent variables of the non-
audit-fee model (equation (A2)). Nevertheless, the audit-fee model also features variables that are 
not related to non-audit work, namely, auditor opinion (OPIN), the reporting lag (LAG), and the 
accelerated-filer indicator (FILER). The non-audit-fee model includes effective tax rate (TAX) as 
a unique variable to capture the effect of tax-related services. To mitigate a possible endogeneity 
problem, we include in the audit-fee model the lagged C_Score (LC_SCORE), which is a firm-
specific measure of conditional conservatism (Kahn and Watts, 2009). The results are available 
from the authors upon request. 
